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This  paper  re-evaluates  previous  discussions  of  inter-reglonal  tax  incidence  and  tax  exportation. 
A  two  region  general  equilibrium  model  IS  developed  that  allows  for  inter-regional  capital 
mobility  and  explicit  commodity  price  determmation,  where  one  of  the  two  regions  is 
incompletely  specialized.  Conditions  are  determined  under  which  either  region  will  be  able  to 
export  a  production  tax.  Also,  the  link  between  tax  exportation  and  the  welfare  of  the  taxing 
region  is  analyzed.  In  the  case  where  taxes  are  not  equal  to  zero  initially.  tax  exportation  may 
be  inadvisable  even  when  it  is  possible. 
1.  Introduction 
Politicians  have  long  recognized  the  advantages  of  adopting  tax  structures 
that  shift  or  export  the  burden  of  taxation  onto  those  residing  in  other  areas. 
Traditional  examples  of  such  taxes  are  the  8 I:,, sales  tax  and  $2.00  per  night 
room  occupancy  charge  levied  on  hotel  accommodations  in  New  York  City, 
the  taxes  levied  on  stock  market  transactions  in  New  York,  life  insurance 
policies  written  by  Connecticut  based  corporations,  and  restaurant  services  in 
many  large  cities.  More  recently,  general  interest  within  the  United  States 
has  been  focussed  on  the  tax  exportation  question  because  of  the  growing 
importance  of  state-imposed  production  taxes  on  natural  resources  and  fuel 
supplies.  For  instance,  Alaska  presently  levies  a  12.25 (I,, severance  tax  on  the 
gross  value  of  crude  oil  produced  and  Montana’s  severance  tax  on  surface 
mined  coal  can  be  as  high  as  30 o,l of  the  FOB  mine  price.  Legislators  from 
non-energy  producing  states  thus  have  been  motivated  to  press  for  federally 
imposed  ceilings  on  state  mineral  production  taxes  of  this  type.’ 
The  exact  conditions  under  which  a  tax  exportation  policy  could  be 
pursued  most  successfully,  however,  are  not  yet  completely  understood  for  at 
least  two  reasons.  First,  theoretical  investigations  of  tax  exportation  have 
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adopted  some  assumptions  that  have  unnecessarily  limited  the  range  of  their 
potential  results.  For  instance,  Mundell  (1960)  and  Friedlaender  and 
Vandendorpe  (1968)  considered  optimal  tax  strategies  under  the  assumption 
that  factors  of  production  cannot  move  between  regions.  McLure  (1969),  on 
the  other  hand,  allows  for  inter-regional  capital  mobility  and  endogenous 
commodity  price  determination  but  requires  that  each  region  produce  a 
single  good,  an  assumption  that  greatly  restricts  the  types  of  resource 
movements  occurring  when  factors  of  production  attempt  to  avoid  the 
impact  of  a  tax.  Second,  the  most  frequently  employed  measure  of  tax 
exportation,  a  movement  in  the  terms  of  trade,  is  misleading  because  it 
neglects  important  considerations  such  as  the  net  debtorxreditor  status  of  a 
region  and  the  revenue  collected  from  taxes  already  levied. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  derive  some  new  results  on  inter-regional 
tax  incidence  and  tax  exportation  within  the  context  of  a  two  good,  two 
factor,  two  region  model  that  allows  for:  (1)  one  of  the  two  regions  to  be 
incompletely  specialized  in  production,  (2)  inter-regional  mobility  of  capital, 
and  (3)  explicit  relative  commodity  price  determination.  This  framework  is 
not  an  arbitrary  one,  as  shown  by  Jones  and  Ruffin  (1975)  in  their  analysis 
of  production  patterns  in  a  2-good-2-factor-2-country  model  with  mobile 
capital.  They  demonstrate  that  when  technology  in  a  region  gives  it  a 
comparative  advantage  in  producing  one  good  at  all  possible  costs  of  capital, 
then  in  general  at  any  relative  price  ratio  one  region  at  most  will  be 
incompletely  specialized.’  In  any  case,  the  key  difference  between  this  model 
and  McLure’s  is  that  the  former  allows  for  incomplete  specialization  in 
production  in  one  region.  This  particular  extension  was  motivated  by 
Mieszkowski’s  (1969,  p.  I 112)  argument  that  McLure’s  assumption  of 
complete  specialization  in  both  regions  is  the  weakest  point  in  his  analysis 
and  Homma’s  (1977)  conjecture  that  a  relaxation  of  this  assumption  would 
be  a  useful  generalization.  As  shown  in  section  3,  Homma’s  conjecture  is 
correct  in  the  sense  that  many  of  the  conclusions  derived  when  both 
economies  are  assumed  to  be  completely  specialized  do  not  carry  over  to  the 
case  of  incomplete  specialization.  To  illustrate,  McLure  suggests  that  a  rise  in 
a  production  tax  imposed  in  one  region  results  in  a  decline  in  the  wage- 
rental  ratio  in  the  other  region.  In  the  model  presented  here,  no  such 
unambiguous  prediction  can  be  made  in  the  case  of  a  tax  levied  in  the 
unspecialized  region:  the  two  wage-rental  ratios  may  either  rise  or  fail 
depending  upon  considerations  such  as  the  relative  factor  intensity  of  the 
‘The  present  model  does  not  reflect  all  possible  cases.  For  example,  the  imposition  of  a  tax  on 
the  unspecialkd  region’s  export  good  may  drive  its  production  to  zero.  Also,  in  the  case  where 
the  regional  pattern  of  comparative  advantage  varies  depending  upon  the  return  to  capital  faced, 
then  incomplete  specialization  in  both  regions  may  be  possible  even  when  a  production  tax  is 
imposed.  Because  that  possibility  rests  on  the  particular  configuration  of  technologies,  capital 
endowments  and  relative  prices,  subsequent  discussion  of  the  case  of  mcomplete  specialization 
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good  on  which  the  tax  is  levied.  Moreover,  the  wage-rental  ratio  in  the 
completely  specialized  region  moves  in  the  same,  rather  than  in  the  opposite 
direction,  as  its  counterpart  in  the  incompletely  specialized  region. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  into  four  additional  sections. 
Section  2  specifies  the  model,  which  pursues  an  approach  developed  by 
Jones  (1965)  that  also  has  been  applied  in  a  public  finance  context  by 
Vandendorpe  and  Friedlaender  (1976)  and  Friedlaender  and  Vandendorpe 
(1978).  Section  3  explains  the  changes  in  relative  output  prices  and  the 
distribution  of  income  that  result  from  levying  production  taxes  on  a  region’s 
export  good.3  Section  4  then  uses  the  results  obtained  in  section  3  in  order 
to  determine  where  a  tax  exportation  policy  would  be  possible  and  when  it 
would  be  in  the  interest  of  a  region  to  pursue  that  goal.  For  example,  when 
taxes  initially  exist  in  both  regions,  the  incompletely  specialized  region 
unambiguously  can  be  projected  to  export  a  production  tax  only  if its  export 
good  is  labor  intensive  and  the  other  region  is  a  net  debtor.  Moreover,  even 
when  tax  exportation  is  possible,  a  region  still  may  end  up  worse  off  by 
imposing  a  production  tax.  Implications  of  this  nature  are  developed  for 
both  regions.  Concluding  comments  and  implications  are  drawn  out  in 
section  5. 
2.  An  inter-regional  general  equilibrium  model 
This  model  examines  a  closed  economy  where  two  final  goods,  X,  and  X,, 
are  produced  using  two  primary  factors,  capital  and  labor.  The  economy  is 
divided  into  two  regions,  A  and  B,  that  have  the  power  to  levy  different 
commodity  production  taxes.  Output  prices  are  determined  through  trade.  In 
addition,  capital  is  assumed  to  be  fixed  in  supply  to  the  entire  economy  but 
perfectly  mobile  inter-regionally,  while  each  region’s  supply  of  labor  is 
completely  inelastic.  This  assumption  is  obviously  at  variance  with  reality 
since  workers  frequently  move  from  region  to  region  in  search  of 
employment.  However,  it  does  capture  the  relative  ease  with  which  capital 
may  move  inter-regionally  as  compared  with  labor.  These  factor  mobility 
assumptions  have  two  important  implications.  First,  equilibrium  returns  to 
capital  owners  must  be  inter-regionally  identical  while  wage  rates  may  be 
inter-regionally  different.  Thus,  the  wage-rental  ratio  in  the  two  regions  may 
differ  as  well.  Second,  as  demonstrated  in  the  work  of  Jones  and  Ruffin,  one 
of  the  two  regions  is  likely  to  be  completely  specialized  in  production  while 
‘McLure  and  Homma  describe  the  effects  of  factor  and  consumption  taxation  as  well  as 
production  taxation.  In  this  paper,  attention  is  focused  exclusively  on  production  taxation 
because  the  complication  of  incomplete  specialization  in  one  region  causes  the  effects  of  such 
taxes  to  be  very  different  depending  on  which  region  is  assumed  to  impose  them.  Furthermore, 
to  examine  taxes  on  factors  in  a  single  sector,  a  corporate  income  tax  for  example,  raises 
possible  conflicts  between  factor  intensity  definitions  in  value  versus  physical  terms,  and 
potentially  gives  rise  to  perverse  responses  of  output  to  price  changes  [Batra  (1973)]. 
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the  other  may  be  incompletely  specialized.  In  the  discussion  to  follow,  region 
A  is  assumed  to  be  incompletely  specialized  and,  therefore,  produces  both  X, 
and  X,  while  region  B  produces  only  Xi. 
The  most  appropriate  applications  of  the  model  just  described  lie  in 
analyzing  the  inter-regional  incidence  of  the  traditional  attempts  to  export 
taxes  mentioned  in  the  introduction.  Brokerage  and  insurance  services,  for 
example,  are  inter-regionally  traded  and  assuming  that  they  are  produced 
using  only  capital  and  labor  does  not  appear  to  be  an  unwarranted 
simplification.  Questions  regarding  the  inter-regional  incidence  of  mineral 
severance  taxation  are  somewhat  more  difficult  to  address  in  the  context  of 
the  present  model,  because  natural  resource  commodities  are  generally  not 
produced  using  only  capital  and  labor.  Ideally,  a  third  factor,  such  as  land 
from  which  the  natural  resource  is  extracted,  could  be  included  and,  to 
achieve  even  greater  realism,  the  natural  resource  could  be  treated  as  an 
intermediate  input  in  the  production  of  both  X,  and  X,.  These  additional 
features  would,  of  course,  produce  a  richer,  though  less  determinate,  set  of 
results.  However,  to  pursue  these  complications  here  would  draw  attention 
away  from  the  critical  role  played  by  incomplete  specialization  in  production. 
Nevertheless,  some  insights  into  the  effect  of  severance  taxation  still  can  be 
obtained  by  re-interpreting  the  results  to  be  presented  in  sections  3  and  4. 
Simply  assume  that  the  mobile  factor  is  actually  a  bundle  of  labor  and 
capital  used  in  fixed  proportions  and  the  immobile  factor  is  actually  land. 
The  exact  algebraic  specification  of  the  model  is  quite  similar  to  that  used 
by  Jones  (1965).  On  the  production  side,  the  basic  assumptions  are:  (1) 
production  functions  for  each  good  exhibit  constant  returns  to  scale,  and  (2) 
factor  and  commodity  markets  are  perfectly  competitive.  Together,  these  two 
assumptions  imply  that  all  factors  of  production  are  fully  employed  and  that 
entrepreneurs  earn  zero  after-tax  economic  profits.  For  region  A,  the  full 
employment  conditions  may  be  expressed  algebraically  as 
while  the  zero  after-tax  profit  conditions  are 
where  Cc  denotes  the  input-output  coefficient  in  region  A  describing  the 
average  quantity  of  factor  i  (i=  L,K)  used  to  produce  one  unit  of  commodity 
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fixed  supply  of  labor  in  A,  K,  denotes  the  amount  of  capital  used  in  A,  wA 
denotes  the  wage  rate  in  A,  r  denotes  the  common  rental  rate  of  return  to 
capital  owners  in  A  and  in  B,  Pj  denotes  the  price  of  commodity  j  prevailing 
in  A  and  B,  and  t,,  denotes  the  production  tax  rate  on  commodity  2 in  A.4 
In  region  B,  the  full  employment  and  zero  profit  conditions  are  analogous 
to  those  for  A.  These  equations  are 
CLX,,  =-I%,  (5) 
CB,,X,,=&J,  (6) 
C~,w,+C::,r=P,(l-t,,),  (7) 
where  all  variable  definitions  should  be  obvious  in  light  of  the  discussion  of 
the  production  side  of  the  model  for  region  A.  However,  the  input-output 
coefficients  CF,  and  Cii  could  be  different  from  their  counterparts  for  region 
A  due  to  inter-regional  differences  in  the  wage-rental  ratio.’  The  model  is 
closed  by:  (1) constraining  the  sum  of K,  and  K,  to  be  fixed  at  K, 
K,+K,=K,  (8) 
and  (2)  explicitly  specifying  the  demand  side  of  the  economy  so  as  to 
endogenously  determine  the  commodity  price  ratio.  The  demand  relations 
are 
D,lD,  =f(P),  (9) 
D,  =X,,+X,,,  (10) 
D,  =X,,,  (11) 
where  Dj  denotes  the  total  demand  for  commodity  j  in  regions  A  and  B 
taken  together  and  P=  P,/P,  denotes  the  common  commodity  price  ratio 
faced  by  consumers  in  each  region.  Eq.  (9)  reflects  the  assumption  that  tastes 
in  the  two  regions  are  identical  and  homothetic  while  eqs.  (10)  and  (11) 
specify  that  total  demand  for  both  goods  must  equal  total  supply. 
Additionally,  this  demand  system  implicitly  assumes  that  the  governments  in 
both  regions  A  and  B  either:  (1)  spend  the  production  tax  revenue  collected 
%ince  this  paper  considers  only  the  case  of  production  taxes  levied  on  export  goods,  no  taxes 
are  assumed  to  be  imposed  on  the  production  of  X,,.  As  will  be  indicated  momentarily,  this 
model  assumes  that  region  A  exports  X,,  to  region  B  and  that  region  B  exports  X,,  to  region 
A. 
51nter-regional  differences  in  production  methods  constitute  another 
not  equal  the  CF,.  The  discussion  to  follow  allows  for  this  possibility  as 
reason  why  the  C:  may 
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in  exactly  the  same  way  as  it  would  be  spent  by  private  individuals,  or  (2) 
immediately  redistribute  all  tax  revenues  collected  to  the  private  sector. 
3.  Inter-regional  effects  of  production  taxation 
To  recapitulate,  the  model  to  be  applied  consists  of  eqs.  (1)  through  (11). 
Attention  is  now  directed  to  predicting  changes  in  the  model’s  endogenous 
variables  that  occur  in  response  to  changes  in  the  tax  parameters,  t,,  and 
tlB.  In  other  words,  two  situations  are  considered  here,  a  production  tax 
imposed  on  the  export  good  of  the  incompletely  specialized  region,  and  a 
production  tax  levied  in  the  completely  specialized  region.  Conclusions 
drawn  in  the  following  discussions  rest  on  the  general  case,  where  the  price 
elasticity  of  demand  and  elasticities  of  substitution  in  production  are  not 
equal  to  zero. 
3.1.  Production  tax  on  X,, 
The  direction  of  change  in  the  relative  commodity  price  ratio,  P,  in 
response  to  a  change  in  t,,,  is  a  key  consideration  in  determining  the  general 
equilibrium  effects  of  this  tax  shift.  As  shown  in  the  appendix,  the  relative 
price  of  X,,  unambiguously  rises;  however,  the  price  producers  of  X,, 
receive  for  their  output,  P(1  -t,,),  must  fall  in  the  face  of  an  increase  in  tzA. 
Thus,  the  price  of  X,,  increases  by  a  smaller  percentage  than  that  created  by 
the  tax  wedge.  The  result  of  this  increase  in  the  relative  price  of  X,  is  that 
consumers  in  both  regions  demand  less  of  it  and  more  of  X,,  while  the 
reduction  in  the  after-tax  price  received  by  producers  of  X,  reduces  their 
incentive  to  produce,  and  encourages  a  shift  in  production  toward  Xi.  The 
way  in  which  this  greater  output  of  X,  is  divided  between  the  two  regions, 
however,  depends  upon  whether  X,,  is  the  capital  intensive  or  the  labor 
intensive  commodity  in  region  A.  If  X,,  is  capital  intensive,  when  the  output 
of  this  commodity  is  reduced,  producers  of  Xi,  would  be  unwilling  to 
absorb  all  of  the  released  capital  at  unchanged  factor  prices.  Hence,  there 
would  be  a  tendency  for  region  A  to  export  capital  to  region  B.  With  an 
increased  supply  of  capital,  Xi,  would  rise.  On  the  other  hand,  if  X,,  were 
labor  intensive,  then  region  A  would  import  capital  from  region  B  causing 
Xi,  to  rise  and  Xi,  to  fall. 
These  same  factor  intensity  conditions  are  also  relevant  in  determining  the 
effects  of  a  change  in  t,,  on  the  nominal  factor  prices  wA,  wr,,  and  Y. As 
expected,  the  direction  of  change  in  returns  to  capital  depends  upon  whether 
region  B  exports  or  imports  capital.  If  more  capital  flows  into  region  B  to 
work  with  the  same  fixed  amount  of  labor,  returns  to  capital  must  fall, 
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capital  must  rise,  Therefore,  recalling  the  reasoning  from  the  preceding 
paragraph,  the  case  of  falling  returns  to  capital  arises  when  X,,  is  capital 
intensive  relative  to  X,,,  while  returns  to  capital  will  rise  when  X,,  is  labor 
intensive.  Knowing  the  change  in  the  returns  to  capital  allows  the  offsetting 
effect  on  wage  rates  to  be  predicted.  The  zero  profit  conditions  facing 
producers  of  X,,  and  X,,  can  be  used  to  show  that  wages  in  both  regions 
must  fall  when  returns  to  capital  rise,  and  vice  versa.  For  example.  in  the 
case  of  a  reduction  in  wages,  the  economic  rationale  is  as  follows:  the 
outflow  of  capital  from  region  B  causes  a  reduction  in  the  capital--labor  ratio 
there  (and  consequently  a  fall  in  labor’s  productivity),  while  production  in 
region  A  shifts  away  from  the  labor-intensive  good,  X,,,  thereby  reducing 
demand  for  labor  services  at  the  original  wage. 
These  results  regarding  the  effect  on  factor  rewards  of  a  change  in  fZA 
stand  in  contrast  to  those  derived  by  McLure  and  Homma.  As  indicated  in 
the  introduction,  these  authors  argue  on  the  basis  of  a  model  in  which  both 
regions  are  completely  specialized  that  the  wage-rental  ratio  should  fall  in 
the  region  imposing  the  tax  and  rise  in  the  other  region.  The  analysis  just 
presented,  however,  suggests  that  after  allowing  for  incomplete  specialization 
in  one  region,  a  somewhat  wider  range  of  results  is  possible.  In  particular: 
(1)  the  wage-rental  ratio  may  move  in  either  direction  in  both  regions, 
depending  upon  relative  factor  intensities  of  production  in  region  A ; and  (2) 
the  wage-rental  ratio  must  move  in  the  same,  rather  than  in  the  opposite, 
direction  in  the  two  regions. 
3.2.  Production  tux  on  X,, 
If  a  production  tax  were  imposed  in  the  specialized  region  B, the  output  of 
X,,  would  tend  to  fall.  This  output  reduction  would  lead  to  capital  exports 
from  region  B  to  region  A  and  consequently:  (1)  a  fall  in  the  wage  rate  paid 
to  workers  in  B,  (2)  a  rise  in  the  wage  rate  paid  to  workers  in  A,  and  (3)  a 
fall  in  the  returns  to  capital  owners.  A  brief  explanation  of  these  results  is  as 
follows.  In  order  to  avoid  the  impact  of  the  tax  imposed  in  region  B, 
capitalists  are  willing  to  accept  a  lower  return  as  they  move  out  of  the 
region.  Labor  productivity  and  wages  in  region  B  fall  as  capital  leaves.  By 
way  of  contrast,  in  region  A  wages  paid  to  labor  will  rise  when  capital  can 
be  obtained  more  cheaply,  a  result  which  can  be  seen  by  examining  the  zero 
profit  condition  for  producers  of  X,,.  These  unambiguous  outcomes,  which 
hold  regardless  of  the  relative  factor  intensities  of  production  in  region  A,  are 
exactly  those  projected  by  McLure.  However,  the  effects  of  a  change  in  t,, 
on  P,  X,,,  and  X,,  are  not  quite  so  straightforward  and  are,  therefore 
considered  in  greater  detail. 
Unlike  the  case  of  t,,,  an  increase  in  the  tax  rate  t,,  can  cause  the  relative 
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using  relatively  more  capital  intensive  methods  in  region  A.  If  X,,  is  capital 
intensive  relative  to  Xi,,  the  incoming  capital  to  region  A  would  stimulate 
production  of  X,,  and  reduce  production  of  Xi,.  Since  Xi,  also  falls  in  the 
face  of  a  rise  in  t,,,  there  is  a  shift  away  from  X,  production  and  into  X, 
production,  causing  the  relative  price  of  X,  to  fall.  On  the  other  hand,  if Xi, 
is  relatively  more  capital  intensive  than  X,,,  then  the  incoming  capital 
would  lead  to  a  more  than  proportional  increase  in  the  output  of  Xi,,  as 
compared  with  the  decrease  in  production  of  Xi,,  and  a  decline  in  the 
output  of  X,,.  In  this  situation,  as  shown  in  the  appendix,  X,  becomes 
scarce  relative  to  X,  when  t,,  rises  and  therefore  the  relative  price  of  X, 
rises. 
3.3.  Extensions  of  the  model 
The  two  sets  of  results  presented  here  have  contrasted  the  implications  of  a 
situation  where  one  region  is  incompletely  specialized  versus  the  case 
analyzed  by  McLure  where  both  regions  are  completely  specialized.  Still 
other  outcomes  could  be  derived  if  the  model  were  expanded  further.  Both 
regions  might  be  incompletely  specialized,  for  instance,  if  industry-specific 
factors  were  included  or  if  non-traded  goods  were  incorporated  into  the 
analysis.  In  the  former  case  with  three  factors  of  production,  greater 
attention  would  have  to  be  paid  to  the  factor  intensity  concept  used  in 
predicting  inter-regional  capital  flows  and  factor  price  changes.  In  the  case  of 
non-traded  goods,  some  of  the  additional  factors  to  consider  would  be:  (1) 
the  degree  of  substitutability  between  traded  and  non-traded  goods  in  each 
region;  (2)  a  distinction  between  the  income  earned  by  residents  of  each 
region  and  the  place  where  it  is  spent;  and  (3)  recognition  of  the  relative 
factor  intensities  of  production  in  each  region.  Even  without  extending  the 
model  to  the  case  of  incomplete  specialization  in  both  regions,  additional 
complications  would  be  introduced  by  treating  Xi,  and  Xi,  as  imperfect 
substitutes.  For  instance,  if  Xi,  and  X,,  are  much  closer  substitutes  than 
Xi,  and  Xi,,  then  imposing  a  tax  on  X,,  will  lead  to  a  larger  percentage 
increase  in  demand  for  X1 A  than  Xi,.  This  factor  may  offset  the  tendency 
for  capital  to  flow  out  of  region  A  into  region  B,  a  result  previously  shown 
to  hold  unambiguously  in  the  case  where  X,,  is  capital  intensive. 
Thus,  the  results  discussed  above  are  by  no  means  a  completely  general 
treatment  of  inter-regional  tax  incidence  issues.  Rather,  they  are  a  useful  first 
step  in  illustrating  how  McLure’s  distributional  results  for  the  polar  case  of 
completely  aggregated  single  product  regions  may  be  modified  once  an 
element  of  disaggregation  is  introduced  by  allowing  a  region  to  be 
incompletely  specialized.  Also,  by  limiting  the  model  to  two  goods,  the 
popularized  link  between  tax  exportation  and  terms  of  trade  movements  can 
be  examined  more  readily.  The  next  section  of  the  paper  pursues  that  topic. S.D.  Gerking  and  J.H.  Mutti,  The  exportation  of  taxes  241 
4.  The  potential  for  regional  tax  exportation 
In  this  section,  standards  are  suggested  that  are  useful  in  judging  whether 
a  region  has  successfully  exported  a  production  tax.  These  standards  are  then 
linked  to  the  factor  reward  and  output  price  effects  of  tax  changes  discussed 
in  the  previous  section.  As  Gillis  (1979)  points  out  in  a  recent  discussion  of 
regional  tax  incidence,  the  existence  and  magnitude  of  tax  exportation  is  all 
too  frequently  measured  according  to  changes  in  a  single  variable  such  as  the 
relative  commodity  price.  These  univariate  measures,  he  contends,  simply 
cannot  capture  all  of  the  important  dimensions  of  the  regional  tax 
exportation  question.  The  analysis  to  follow,  which  is  based  upon  a 
conventional  manipulation  of  a  very  simple  regional  welfare  function, 
demonstrates  that  Gillis’  conjecture  is  correct  in  the  context  of  the  present 
model  in  all  but  a  special  case.  The  discussion  is  organized  by:  (1)  specifying 
a  welfare  function  for  each  region,  (2)  showing  how  these  welfare  functions 
may  be  used  to  measure  tax  exportation,  (3)  presenting  conditions  under 
which  regional  production  taxes  may  be  successfully  exported,  and  (4) 
discussing  whether  such  taxes,  even  if  exportation  is  possible,  are  desirable 
from  a  regional  welfare  maximization  standpoint. 
Assume  that  both  regions  A  and  B  have  regional  welfare  indices,  U,  and 
U,,  defined  by  a  common  welfare  function,  U. 6 These  indices  are  determined 
according  to 
uj="(Dlj3D*j),  j=A,  B,  (12) 
where  the  Dij  denote  the  consumption  of  commodity  i  in  region  j.  Since,  in 
equilibrium,  the  commodity  price  ratio  must  equal  the  ratio  of  marginal 
utilities,  a  change  in  region  j’s  utility  may  be  measured  by 
dUj/U,j=dD,j+PD,j,  j=A,  B,  (13) 
where  Uij  denotes  marginal  utility  with  respect  to  a  change  in  region  j’s 
consumption  of  good  i.  Eq.  (13)  is  useful  because  it  can  easily  be  related  to 
an  income  measure.  In  this  model,  regional  income  can  be  represented  as 
total  spending  on  final  goods  and  services  or  as  total  factor  income  plus 
indirect  business  taxes.  For  region  A,  income  (Y,)  is  given  by 
6This  condition  is  imposed  merely  to  simplify  the  algebraic  derivations  reported.  No  use  is 
made  of  the  implication  that  welfare  can  be  measured  in  any  common  units  across  regions.  The 
only  restriction  on  regional  utility  functions  used  in  this  study  is  the  previously  explained 
condition  that  tastes  are  identical  and  homothetic  in  each  region.  Obviously,  that  condition  can 
hold  when  one  function  is  a  monotonic  transformation  of  the  other  without  forcing  the 
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while  for  region  B income  (Y,)  is  defined  as 
(15) 
In  eqs.  (14)  and  (15),  IC* and  K~  denote  the  amount  of  capital  owned  by 
regions  A  and  B,  respectively,  rather  than  the  amount  of  capital  actually 
utilized  in  each  region.  The  difference  (Kj-xj)  would  then  show  whether 
region  j  is  a  debtor  or  a  creditor  region.  Totally  differentiating  eqs.  (14)  and 
(15),  substituting  these  expressions  into  the  corresponding  welfare  indices 
represented  by  eq.  (13),  and  then  dividing  by  the  current  level  of  income  in 
the  region,  yields  the  following  equations  for  changes  in  welfare: 
(17) 
where  the  *  notation  indicates  the  percentage  change  in  a  variable,  and  the 
Tj  terms  reflect  the  change  in  a  region’s  tax  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the 
original  price  of  the  taxed  good.  The  various  coefficients  of  these  terms  are 
positive  fractions.  The  p  terms  denote  shares  of  regional  income  accruing  to 
labor  or  to  the  capital  owned  by  regional  residents,  $2j  is  the  share  of  region 
j’s  income  spent  on  X,,  the  4ij  expresses  tax  collections  in  each  region  as  a 
percentage  of  regional  income,  and  the  dij  represent  receipts  of  firms 
producing  commodity  i in  region  j  as  a  percentage  of  regional  income. 
The  welfare  functions  in  eqs.  (16)  and  (17)  can  be  used  to  determine  how 
effectively  regional  production  taxes  can  be  exported.  Following  previous 
analyses  in  the  tax  incidence  literature,  an  increase  in  production  taxes  in 
one  region  is  defined  to  be  exported,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  other  region  if 
the  latter  region  suffers  a  welfare  loss.’  If  what  one  region  loses  the  other 
gains,  then  the  opportunity  to  export  a  tax  also  signifies  an  opportunity  to 
increase  regional  income.  Hence,  the  traditional  definition  of  tax  exportation 
reflects  more  than  a  sadistic  desire  simply  to  make  the  other  region  worse 
off.  In  the  discussion  to  follow,  this  link  between  regional  welfare  and  tax 
exportation  is  explored  further. 
‘McLure  (1969)  formulates  an  analogous  definition  of  tax  exportation  in  terms  of  changes  rn 
sources  and  uses  of  mcome,  an  approach  developed  in  Musgrave  (1959)  and  Mieszkowski 
(1967).  That  method  leads  to  the  same  conclusions  regarding  tax  exportation  as  those  derived 
here  from  explicit  utility  maximization.  An  additional  feature  of  the  McLure  framework  adopted 
here  is  that  no  attention  is  paid  to  the  potential  importance  of  another  level  of  government.  For 
instance,  allowing  for  a  federal  government  which  taxes  income  earned  in  both  regions  results  in 
other  avenues  for  regional  tax  exportation.  When  regional  taxes  are  deductible  expenses  in  the 
calculation  of  federal  tax  liabilities,  then  a  portion  of  the  region’s  production  tax  can  be 
exported  even  when  the  terms  of  trade  and  income  factors  identified  here  do  not  move  in  its 
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Eqs.  (16)  and  (17)  may  be  used  to  derive  the  two  tax  exportation 
expressions,  do,JT,,  and  dw,/T,,:’ 
do,  1 
(18) 
dwA  _.=  .!-[, 
T  TIB 
'L,Aw~+~KAr*-(~2A-~2A)P*+~2AX~AI. 
1  I3 
(19) 
These  expressions,  which  implicitly  assume  that  a  region  does  not  change  its 
tax  in  the  face  of  a  tax  change  by  the  other  region,  can  be  simplified  by  using 
the  three  zero-profit  conditions  cited  earlier,  eqs.  (3)  (4)  and  (7).  More 
specifically,  all  changes  in  wage  rates  and  capital  returns  can  be  re-expressed 
in  terms  of  changes  in  production  taxes  and  relative  output  prices  as  shown 
in  eqs.  (20)  and  (21): 
(20) 
TIA  -L(L,,~‘,,-L,,K,A)~~~-*~~+~~~  1 
(21) 
where  L,,  and  KiA  denote  the  quantity  of  labor  and  capital  used  in  the  pro- 
duction  of  commodity  i  (i =  1,2)  in  region  A.  In  the  case  of  no  initial  taxes, 
the  4ij  terms  in  each  equation  equal  zero,  and  the  key  role  of  terms  of  trade 
movements  becomes  evident.  However,  it  is  not  possible  to  state  a  priori 
whether  the  relationship  between  tax  exportation  and  a  shift  in  the  terms  of 
trade  is  positive  or  negative. 
A  useful  step  in  identifying  the  sign  of  this  relationship  is  to  consider  the 
situation  that  would  emerge  if  no  inter-regional  capital  flows  took  place. 
For  this  case,  in  eq.  (20)  tiB -K,=O  and  consequently  only  one  term, 
-  $~BP*/TzA>  would  remain.  Even  if  capital  were  inter-regionally  immobile, 
this  term  still  would  be  negative,  signifying  that  region  B  becomes  worse  off. 
“As  noted  by  McLure  (1969,  p.  465),  this  framework  for  Incidence  analysis  ignores  the  excess 
burden  or  deadweight  loss  of  higher  taxation,  and  consequently  yields  the  unreasonable 
implication  that  higher  exported  taxes  must  benefit  the  taxing  state  more  than  lower  ones. 
Therefore,  the  analysis  is  best  construed  as  indicating  the  direction  of  change  in  welfare  for  an 
infinitesimal  tax  change.  Also,  this  qualification  regarding  the  omission  of  excess  burden  should 
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That  is,  the  imposition  of  the  tax  would  result  in  a  capital  transfer  from  X,, 
production  into  X 1A  production  causing  P  to  rise.  Applying  the  same 
assumption  of  no  inter-regional  capital  mobility  to  eq.  (21)  also  would  yield 
a  single  term,  (a,,-$,,)(P*/T,,).  However,  in  this  case,  P*/T,,  would  equal 
zero.  No  factor  transfers  from  region  B  to  region  A  are  possible,  and  all 
factors  are  constrained  to  remain  fully  employed,  thus  leaving  X,, 
production  unchanged.  As  a  result,  region  B  has  no  opportunity  to  export  its 
production  tax  to  region  A. 
A  further  insight  comes  from  again  ruling  out  initial  taxes  and  inter- 
regional  capital  mobility  and  then  considering  the  effect  of  a  production  tax 
on  the  welfare  of  the  region  where  it  was  imposed  (i.e.  considering  dw,/T,, 
and  dmB/TrB).  In  the  case  of  region  A,  the  single  term  obtained  is  (6,, 
-  tizA)(P*/TzA),  which  is  positive  since  P*/T,,  > 0  and  the  production  of  A’s 
export  good  exceeds  its  home  consumption.  In  other  words,  region  A 
becomes  better  off  since  the  imposition  of  the  tax  on  X,,  moves  the  terms  of 
trade  in  its  favor.  Likewise,  in  the  case  of  region  B,  the  single  term 
-  GzBP*/Tl,  =0  is  obtained  which  again  illustrates  the  link  between 
movements  in  the  terms  of  trade  (or  the  absence  thereof)  and  a  region’s 
welfare.  Moreover,  the  sum  r,(do,/T,,)+  Y,(do,/T,,)=  Y,(do,/T,,) 
+  YB(dWrJTJ=O,  which  in  turn  indicates  that  (dU,/U,,)(l/T,,)= 
-  (dUB/UIR)(l/T2A)  and  that  (d~.&,,)(l/T,,)=  -  (dU,IU,,)(l/T,,).  Thus, 
the  traditional  definition  of  tax  exportation. 
When  capital  is  mobile,  eqs.  (20)  and  (21)  no  longer  reduce  to  single  terms 
based  on  terms  of  trade  movements  alone,  even  if  no  taxes  are  levied 
initially.  Examination  of  eq.  (20)  shows  that  since  05  P*/T,,z  1,  region  A 
will  be  able  to  export  a  production  tax  on  X,,  in  two  alternative  cases:  (1) 
when  region  B  is  a  net  debtor  (K~-K,  ~0)  and  X,,  is  labor  intensive 
(&AKIA-KIA&A<O),  or  (2)  h  w  en  region  B  is  a  net  creditor  and  X,,  is 
capital  intensive.g  These  conditions  result  in  changes  in  region  B’s  factor 
incomes  which  are  consistent  with  the  unambiguously  negative  terms  of  trade 
effect  reported  in  section  3.  The  economic  rationale  behind  them  is 
straightforward.  If  X,,  is  labor  intensive,  then  the  tax  causes  wage  rates  to 
fall  in  both  regions  while  capital  returns  rise.  When  region  B  is  a  net  debtor, 
the  fall  in  wages  receives  relatively  greater  weight  (and  the  rise  in  capital 
ircturns  relatively  less  weight)  than  in  the  situation  with  no  capital  mobility 
where  the  two  divergent  movements  in  factor  rewards  simply  offset  each 
other.  Thus,  region  B’s  real  income  must  fall.  In  the  alternative  case  where 
“‘hat  region  A  may  export  a  labor  intensive  good  but  also  be  a  net  creditor  may  seem 
inconsistent  with  traditional  trade  analysis.  As  Jones  indicates,  this  situation  is  quite  possible 
when  technologies  differ  across  regions.  For  instance,  region  A  simply  may  have  much  more 
efticient  technology  for  producing  the  labor  intensive  good,  and  therefore  be  the  sole  supplier  of 
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X ZA is  capital  intensive,  then  the  tax  causes  capital  returns  to  fall  wliilc 
wages  rise  in  both  regions.  For  region  B  to  become  unambiguously  worse  off, 
then  relatively  more  weight  must  be  attached  to  the  fall  in  capital  returns,  a 
situation  arising  if  region  B  were  a  net  creditor.  If  this  combination  of  factor 
intensity  conditions  and  net  creditordebtor  status  were  not  fulfilled,  then 
knowing  that  the  terms  of  trade  moved  in  favor  of  region  A  would  not  be  a 
sufficient  basis  for  predicting  that  it  had  successfully  exported  the  production 
tax  on  X,,. 
With  respect  to  region  B,  again  assume  that  no  tax  is  levied  initially  and 
consider  the  remaining  terms  in  eq.  (21).  Unlike  the  situation  described 
above,  where  region  A’s  production  tax  always  led  to  an  improvement  in  its 
terms  of  trade,  region  B  can  be  assured  of  no  such  outcome  once  capital  is 
free  to  move  inter-regionally.  As  shown  in  section  3,  the  terms  of  trade  will 
move  in  region  B’s  favor  when  X,,  is  capital  intensive  (L,,K,,  -L,,K,, 
>O),  since  the  capital  moving  out  of  region  B  will  be  used  in  the  production 
of  region  A’s  export  good,  X,,.  If  this  relative  price  effect  is  to  be  reinforced 
by  the  factor  income  changes  which  occur,  then  region  A  must  also  be  a  net 
creditor.  lo  In  that  situation,  the  reduced  return  to  capital  receives  relatively 
greater  weight  in  region  A’s  welfare  expression,  and  thus  region  B 
unambiguously  will  be  able  to  export  the  production  tax  which  it  levies. 
Conversely,  even  if  the  terms  of  trade  had  moved  in  favor  of  region  B,  the 
tax  still  might  not  be  exported  if region  A  were  a  net  debtor. 
Additionally,  the  correspondence  between  tax  exportation  and  welfare  in 
the  tax  levying  region  still  holds  when  capital  is  inter-regionally  mobile. 
Although  the  expressions  for  do,/T,,  and  dw,/T,,  do  not  reduce  to  single 
terms,  they  can  be  easily  compared  with  their  counterparts  in  the  tax 
exportation  equations  (20)  and  (21).  Simple  calculations  again  reveal  that 
Y,(do,/T,.)+  Y,(do,/T,,)=  Y,(do,/T,,)+  Y,(dw,/T,,)=O.  Hence,  when 
either  region  levies  a  production  tax,  the  conditions  under  which  it  will 
become  better  off  exactly  parallel  those  where  the  other  region  becomes 
worse  off. 
When  taxes  do  not  equal  zero  initially,  a  situation  which  is  applicable  in 
most  policy  contexts,  the  conditions  under  which  tax  exportation  is  possible 
become  more  complicated.  Also,  the  previously  discussed  correspondence 
between  tax  exportation  and  welfare  in  the  tax  levying  region  breaks  down, 
too.  This  outcome  is  simply  an  example  of  the  theory  of  the  second  best, 
where  the  existence  of  an  initial  distortion  may  reverse  the  assessment  of  a 
policy  change  considered  in  a  distortion  free  economy.  For  instance,  if  X,,  is 
capital  intensive,  then  a  production  tax  levied  on  it  will  cause  capital  to  flow 
out  of  region  A  and  into  region  B,  resulting  in  greater  output  of  Xi,.  If  an 
initial  tax  on  X,,  exists  then  the  greater  tax  revenue  collected  in  region  B 
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may  mean  that  region  A  is  unable  to  export  its  tax  on  X,,  even  though  the 
terms  of  trade  move  in  its  favor  and  even  if  region  B  is  a  net  creditor.  If 
region  A  unambiguously  is  to  be  able  to  export  its  tax  on  X,,,  then  X,, 
must  be  labor  intensive,  so  that  capital  is  drawn  out  of  region  B.  Less  output 
of  X1,  implies  less  tax  revenue  collected  in  region  B,  which,  combined  with 
net  debtor  status  there  is  enough  to  ensure  that  region  A’s  production  tax  is 
exported.  Even  in  this  case,  however,  where  tax  exportation  is  assured,  region 
A  still  may  become  worse  off.  If  region  A  already  has  an  initial  tax  on  X,,, 
then  as  shown  in  eq.  (16),  the  additional  term,  c$~*(P* +X&)  must  be 
included  in  A’s  welfare  change  calculation.  If  demand  for  X,,  is  price  elastic, 
raising  the  tax  on  X,,  will  reduce  tax  revenues  collected  in  region  A,  and 
this  factor  conceivably  could  be  large  enough  to  offset  the  gain  identified 
previously  when  no  initial  tax  was  present. 
Similar  complications  also  arise  with  respect  to  the  previously  discussed 
results  for  a  change  in  TiB  when  both  regions  are  assumed  to  levy  initial 
taxes.  That  is,  even  if  X,,  is  the  capital  intensive  good  in  region  A  (in  which 
case  an  increase  m  t,,  will  cause  the  terms  of  trade  to  move  in  B’s favor)  and 
even  if  region  A  is  a  net  creditor  (in  which  case  the  reduced  return  to  capital 
receives  greater  weight  in  A’s  welfare  expression),  region  B  may  find  that  an 
increase  in  its  production  tax  cannot  be  exported  in  the  sense  of  forcing  a 
decline  in  A’s  welfare.  The  reasoning  here  is  quite  simple:  if  X,,  is  relatively 
more  capital  intensive  than  Xi,  and  is  subject  to  an  initial  tax,  then  an 
increase  m  r,,  will  cause  production  of  it  to  rise  thus  increasing  tax  revenues 
to  region  A.  Moreover,  if the  initial  tax  on  X,,  is  sufficiently  high,  then  these 
increased  revenues  collected  and  redistributed  to  residents  of  A  may  more 
than  offset  what  they  lose  from  adverse  movements  in  the  terms  of  trade  and 
returns  to  capital.  Also,  if  the  output  of  Xi,  is  already  taxed,  any  increase  in 
t,,  could  cause  region  B  to  suffer  a  welfare  decline  since  the  output  of  that 
good  will  necessarily  fall.  This  situation  would  be  more  probable  if  the  initial 
tax  on  X,,  was  substantial  so  that  the  lost  tax  revenue  would  have  a  greater 
chance  to  offset  the  gains  resulting  from  movements  in  the  terms  of  trade 
and  increased  labor  incomes. 
This  range  of  results  contrasts  to  the  more  straightforward  conclusions 
which  McLure  draws  with  respect  to  tax  exportation.  His  model  yields  the 
conclusion  that  the  non-taxing  region  must  become  worse  off  if  it  is  a  net 
creditor,  because  both  its  terms  of  trade  and  rate  of  return  on  foreign 
investment  fall.  In  the  present  model  with  incomplete  specialization  no  such 
simple  characterization  is  possible,  because  the  direction  of  change  in  the 
terms  of  trade  (when  t,,  rises)  or  the  return  to  capital  (when  t,,  rises)  are 
shown  to  depend  critically  upon  factor  intensity  conditions.  Possibilities  for 
successful  tax  exportation  become  even  more  complicated  once  the  possibility 
of  initial  taxes  is  allowed,  and  the  rationale  for  pursuing  tax  exportation  as  a 
regional  goal  is  weakened  considerably. S.D.  Gerking  and  J.H.  Mutti,  The  exportation  of  taxes  24-l 
5.  Conclusions 
This  paper  extends  two  previous  strands  of  the  tax  exportation  literature 
by  developing  a  model  which  allows  for  incomplete  specialization  in  regional 
production  and  capital  mobility  between  regions.  McLure’s  seminal  work 
based  on  complete  specialization  in  regional  production  allowed  strong  a 
priori  predictions  of  the  effect  of  production  taxes  on  relative  factor  rewards 
in  both  regions.  To  make  similar  predictions  in  the  present  model  with  an 
incompletely  specialized  region  requires  further  information  about  relative 
factor  requirements  in  production,  since  factors  can  avoid  taxes  by  moving 
not  only  from  one  region  to  another,  but  also  by  moving  from  one  sector  to 
another.  For  instance,  a  tax  levied  upon  a  capital-intensive  export  good  will 
cause  the  wage-rental  ratio  to  rise  in  both  regions,  while  a  tax  levied  on  a 
labor-intensive  export  good  will  cause  the  wage-rental  ratio  to  fall  in  both 
regions.  , 
The  preceding  discussion  also  puts  earlier  work  in  clearer  perspective  by 
distinguishing  between  the  issue  of  tax  exportation,  defined  in  the  sense  of 
making  the  other  region  bear  part  of  the  burden  of  a  tax,  and  the  question  of 
optimal  regional  tax  policy,  defined  in  terms  of  the  region’s  own  welfare. 
That  the  two  goals  need  not  be  met  at  the  same  time  is  demonstrated  in  the 
present  model,  which  highlights  not  only  the  importance  of  relative  factor 
requirements  and  net-creditor-net-debtor  status,  but  also  second  best  factors 
such  as  the  original  level  of  taxation  before  any  contemplated  policy  change. 
Because  the  analytical  framework  is  developed  in  a  general  way  which  can 
incorporate  other  potentially  important  economic  conditions  and  constraints, 
it  appears  to  be  a  fruitful  starting  point  from  which  to  analyze  many  other 
tax  policy  issues. 
Appendix 
The  purpose  of  this  appendix  is  to  present  the  exact  algebraic  expressions 
for  the  results  of  the  model  and  to  supplement  the  discussion  in  the  main 
body  of  the  paper.  As  indicated  in  section  3,  the  model  consists  of  eqs.  (1) 
through  (11).  To  demonstrate  how  increases  or  decreases  in  the  production 
tax  rates  affect  the  endogenous  variables,  the  equations  of  the  model  are 
rewritten  in  relative  rates  of  change.  For  the  production  side  in  region  A: 
(A3) 
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where  Z*  =dZ/Z,  Lfj = CtjXjAJLA  denotes  the  fraction  of  A’s  labor  employed 
in  the  production  of  commodity  j,  the  price  of  X,,  P,,  has  been  normalized 
to  unity,  T2,, =dt2*/(1  -t,,),  @,  = wAC,,  *  denotes  labor’s  share  of  output  of 
X  f$  = wACt2/P(1  -t,,)  denotes  labor’s  share  of  output  of  X,, 
(c%ilated  as  a  fraction  of  the  price  received  by  producers  of  X,,),  and  the 
remaining  2;  and  6;  are  similarly  defined.  In  addition,  the  7:  (l’=L,K)  can 
be  expressed  as 
where  $’  denotes  the  elasticity  of  substitution  in  the  production  of 
commodity  j  (j=  1,2)  in  region  A.  As  Jones  (1965)  has  suggested,  yt(y$  may 
be  interpreted  as  the  aggregate  percentage  saving  on  labor  (capital)  in  region 
A  at  unchanged  output  levels  that  occurs  when  W*(Y)  increases  by  one 
percent. 
Similar  expressions  for  region  B’s  production  relations  can  be  derived  in 
an  analogous  fashion.  In  relative  rates  of  change,  the  full  employment 
equations  are 
x&+y:(Y*-Wg*)=O,  (A7) 
X&+y::(we*-r*)=K,*,  648) 
where  112  = BB  .,a;,  $  = 0:,$,  and  $,  = /zgi =  1 while  the  zero  profit  equation 
is 
Finally,  the  constraint  on  the  entire  economy’s  supply  of  capital,  in  relative 
rates  of  change,  is 
K*  = k,K;  + k,K,*  = 0,  (AlO) 
where  k,=K,/K  and  k,  =K,/K  and  the  equations  describing  the  demand 
side  of  the  model  can  be  compressed  to 
(All) 
where  rr  1A=(l  -zlB)=x,A/(x,A+x,B)~ 
Substituting  eq.  (AlO)  into  (A8)  allows  the  model  to  be  applied  to  be 
written  in  matrix  notation  as S.D.  Gerking  and  J.H.  Mutti,  The  exportation  of taxes 
- $1  n;,  0  -y;  y;  0  0  o- 
AA  Kl  RA  K2  0  ?4  -Y$  0.  0  -1 
0  0  0  0  y;  -y;  0  0 
0  0  1  0  -  y”K  y;  0  k,, 
0  0  0  ($1  ep,  0  0  0 
0  0  0  o;,  02,  ’  0  -  1  0 
0  0  0  0  OB,,  e;,  0  0 
_nlA  -1  ?riB  0  01  ,  0  -ap  0  - 
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The  determinant  of  the  8 x 8 matrix  on  the  left  hand  side  is 
+~,hd~,  I~AIIeAI)  6414 
Obviously,  ID I IS negative  if  I/lAj>O.  However,  if  ( AAl ~0,  the  first  term  inside 
the  brackets  would  be  negative  while  the  last  three  would  still  be  positive.  In 
order  to  verify  that  the  contribution  of  the  first  term  can  never  be  so  large  as 
to  cause  IDI>O,  consider  the  sum  of  the  first  two  terms  in  (Al)  using  the 
definitional  relations:  (1)  (y~+y~)=y~/C3~1,  (2)  k,,=  k,/k,,  (3)  nlA 
=x,A/(x,A+x,B)~  t4)  n,,=x,,/(x,A+x,,)>  (5)  (AAl=%  -&?I,  (6)  Ai?, 
=LIAJLA,  (7)  I,& =K,,JK,  (8)  i&  =L,,JL,  where  L,,+L,,=L,,  and  (9) 
Oil  =  rK*/X,,.  This  sum  can  be  rewritten  as 
S=O&$  KAXIBKIA 








= ‘K&A(~IB  +x1,1 
-[~KAL,A+~A(X,A-~K,A)+L,AX,,I, 
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which  is  positive  since  the  first  and  third  terms  in  the  brackets  are  positive 
and  since  X,,  -  rK 1A20.  Therefore,  IDI 
of  the  sign  taken  by  /,I*[. 
must  always  be  negative  regardless 
The  exact  algebraic  expressions  for  all  the  tax  impacts  are  presented 
below.  First,  in  the  case  of  a  change  in  t,,: 
The  second  term  in  eq.  (A19)  appears  in  IDI,  and  hence  region  A’s 
production  tax  always  leads  to  an  improvement  in  its  terms  of  trade,  but  not 
by  as  large  a  percentage  as  TzA. Also: 
6420) 
6421) 
wg/TzA =  -  a,e$‘,  eEl k,,  I  A~[// D 150  (A=) 
XTA/T,,={~,~,A,/~*I(Y::+Y~)-~AB~~~BY~(/~~~Y::+/~~~YLA) 
-Y~(Y::+Y~)~/I~I~O,  (A23) 
X~*A/T,B=-{~~/Z~~IO*I(Y~+Y~)-~AB~~BY:: ($IY$+~~IY~) 
+YLAn,A(Y~+Y~)}/IDI~O.  (~24) 
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since  the  last  two  terms  in  the  numerator  of  (A25)  add  to  zero,  a  situation 
that  can  be  easily  verified  by  substituting  the  definitional  expressions  for  all 
symbols  and  then  collecting  terms.  Continuing, 
Eqs.  (A23)  and  (A26)  can  be  used  to  show  that  XT/T,,=n,,(XT,/T,,) 
+~c,~(XT,JT~~)$O  and  that  the  sign  of  this  expression  depends  only  on  the 
sign  of  IO*/. Substituting, 
Consider  the  term  in  square  brackets  in  the  numerator  of  (A27)  reproduced 
below  as  (A28): 
(A281 
which  can  be  shown  to  be  positive  using  the  same  substitution  procedure  as 
was  used  to  show  that  IDI ~0.  More  specifically,  using  the  fact  that  Ii*\  = I& 
-i*  =A*  -I_tA2  and  ($+$!!=~$‘/0~~,  S,  can  be  re-expressed  as  ‘Kl  K2 
(~29) 
Substituting  for  the  terms  in  the  brackets  on  the  right  hand  side  of  (A29), 
B 
s, = 
>‘L  xlAL2A  L2*KAr 
Gl(XIA+XIB) 
But.  since 
(A30) 
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the  remaining  impacts  of  a  change  in  TIB are 
P*/TI,=~BA~{~~A~  TIIB$kA, 
+  (^i’::+%)  bt,  +  nlA2~2)~/~D~$o.  0432) 
As  demonstrated  in  connection  with  evaluating  the  sign  of  I  Dl,  the  term  in 
curly  brackets  in  the  numerator  of  (A32)  is  positive.  Hence  the  sign  of P*/TIB 
depends  only  on  the  sign  of  IO*/. Finally: 
wW’~B=  -{~~~l~~“~>{P*IT,,}~O, 
r*k=  {e;,/je*I}{p*/T,,}  50, 
~,*/T,,=-{~DI-~~,~B,,ICABI~*II~*I}/IDI~~, 
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